Hindsight defence is no defence at all
Tony Blair knew the damage the Iraq invasion would cause, report says
Of all the Chilcot report's findings, special notice must be taken of its vigorous ripping apart of the hindsight defence — that great refuge of politicians following disasters.
You know the one. That's when former leaders, foreign ministers, military chiefs shrug sadly and bemoan the fact they received limited intelligence and "If only we'd known then what we know now…"
It's wiggle-room 101.
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For years, former British prime minister Tony Blair argued he had no regrets for toppling Iraqi dictator Sadam Hussein, he only regretted that the intel acted on, such as warnings of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), was faulty — which is putting it mildly.
I often cringed when listening to British and American invasion hawks sing from the same obfuscation songbook while insisting they'd had no forewarnings that a collapsing Iraq would create cyclones of chaos in the Middle East, including new terrorism waves likely to haunt the world for generations.
I don't buy this hindsight defence because, in the run-up to the invasion, I'd interviewed many well-informed retired military commanders and senior diplomats, even the French foreign minister, and all felt sure intelligence claims were highly suspect and the invasion so poorly planned it was headed for catastrophe.
Remember, people in the French, German and Canadian governments with decades of experience handling world crises and military-diplomatic standoffs shunned any role in invasion, which they thought would cancel out any peaceful solution. If they knew, why didn't Number 10 and the White House?
The risks were 'explicitly identified' before invasion
Chilcot's six-year study concluded that London and Washington knew a lot — but underestimated or discounted most of the looming dangers and pitfalls.
When Blair told the inquiry he could not have foreseen the problems in Iraq, Chilcot would have none of it:
"We do not agree that hindsight is required. The risks of internal strife in Iraq, active Iranian pursuits of its interests, regional instability and al-Qaeda activity in Iraq were each explicitly identified before the invasion," he said in his report.
It's clear Blair did have worries. In a private letter to then president George W. Bush eight months before the invasion, he gently raises "some Iraqis may feel ambivalent about being invaded and could well fight back."
But despite obviously having some sense a civilian insurgency could erupt, Blair reiterated his absolute devotion to the U.S.-led invasion even before UN inspectors had completed their fruitless search for WMDs. Blair wrote: "I will be with you, whatever."
Perhaps inspired by the Winston Churchill/FDR friendship during the Second World War, that phrase would linger heavily over all subsequent private letters sent by Blair, where examples of "whatever" seem to include the possibility of finding no WMDs and, even in the early days of the 2003 invasions, seeing the spread of chaos.
Throughout the crisis, Blair continued to dig Britain further into the U.S. invasion, often without keeping Parliament or even his own cabinet informed. Certainly none of them were told of his unilateral vow to stick with Bush "whatever."
"[It] set the U.K. on a path leading to diplomatic activity in the UN and the possibility of participation in the military action in a way that would make it very difficult for the U.K. to subsequently withdraw its support for the U.S.," Chilcot says in his report.
Blair released intelligence selectively
Indeed, in January 2003, Blair promised the Americans three British combat brigades for operations in southern Iraq, before having received a green light from Parliament and government legal advisors.
Chilcot strongly criticizes Blair's careful choice of which intelligence to feed Parliament and the public in his efforts to keep willingness for war alive in the face of anti-war protests: he revealed one intelligence estimate that Iraq was a security threat to Britain, but withheld another warning that terrorist attacks from al-Qaeda may be expected — the kind of grim reality that might have chilled resolve.
Blair pushed ahead but worried enough to write Bush: "The biggest risk we face is internecine fighting between all the rival groups, religions, tribes, etc., in Iraq when the military strike destabilizes the regime." Got that right.
The main British intelligence arms are also criticized for not being rigorous enough in assessing their findings or honest enough with government ministers. The British military involvement was judged under-resourced and ill-planned (as was the U.S. effort). Blair's management style left the military unclear of what was expected of them.
The warnings of a troubled invasion were underestimated, and, under Blair's direction, military preparations were "wholly inadequate."
Saddam was not an imminent threat
Perhaps the most bitter Chilcot conclusion is that there might never have been this war that has blighted our times, with all the loss of life and collapsed states.
There was, the report concludes, no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein, so a different containment strategy with negotiations, rather similar to the Cold War, might have continued a semi-peace for years.
Blair's urgings on the need for war, the report adds, were presented with "a certainty that was not justified."
Today, Blair refused yet again to take responsibility while still insisting the world is a better place without Hussein.
This same strategy was perfectly expressed back in 2003, just as the invasion started to go very wrong and other world powers criticized the venture as doomed. Blair wrote his friend Bush that the one posture to adopt was clear: "We must be absolutely unapologetic."
It seems not even the 2.6 million words in the report, the anguish of families who lost members to war or the unending nightmare of Iraq and its peoples can dent that resolve.
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